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If someone sees a smile and does not know it for a smile, does not 
understand it as such, does he see it differently from someone who 
understands it? – He mimics it differently, for instance (Wittgenstein, 
1958, p. 198). 
 
[This is one amongst] the multiple instances where Wittgenstein 
suggests that the kind of understanding involved in seeing internal 
relations is not only conceptual but also sensible and mimetic – or 
perhaps better said: that the conceptual is at the same time, and 
sometimes primarily, sensible and mimetic (Krebs, 2010, p. 127). 
 
 
 
1. Rizzolatti and the mirror-neuron 
 
In response to the question “What are the neural bases of action 
understanding?” Giacomo Rizzolatti has been credited with initiating a 
minor Copernican revolution, with far-reaching significance for 
physiotherapy, rehabilitation, and education more generally. At the heart of 
this is a reversal of the schema perception→cognition→movement: rather 
than visual information being prior, it is mapped onto its existing motor 
representation in our nervous system, and the construction of this is 
explained in terms of “mirror-neurons”. This makes the imitation of action 
crucial for our developing understanding, most obviously of the movements 
of other living creatures. In fact, Rizzolatti emphasises that, unlike other 
cognitive capacities, such as object recognition, action understanding has 
never been a main focus of neuroscience. Hence, the practical importance of 
his work. 
What then are the neurophysiological bases of the ability to 
understand the actions of others?  Rizzolatti and his colleagues draw a 
distinction between action as a generic term referring to any intentional 
motor behaviour and a more specific sense in which it denotes “goal-directed 
behaviours that produce a reward for the individual” (Rizzolatti, Fogassi and 
Gallese, 2001, p. 601). They suggest two hypotheses to explain how action 
understanding occurs. According to the “visual hypothesis”, action 
understanding is based on a visual analysis of the different elements that 
form an action, with no motor involvement required. When we observe a 
hand grasping an apple, the association of the elements of the hand, the 
apple, and the movement are sufficient to allow the observer to understand 
the action. The “direct-matching hypothesis”, by contrast, holds that we 
understand actions through mapping the visual representation of the action 
onto our motor representation of the same action. In one experiment with a 
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macaque monkey, for example, food is placed on a tray by a human hand, 
and the monkey grasps the food. The monkey’s brain activity on seeing the 
human hand’s placing of the food is similar to the way it would be if the 
monkey were handling the food. By contrast, when tongs, instead of a 
human hand, are used to place the food, comparable brain activity does not 
occur. In its recognition of the action, the monkey’s motor system is said to 
“resonate”: the same population of neurons that controls the execution of 
the grasping movements becomes active in the motor areas of the observer, 
and it is this that enables the understanding of the observed action. 
Moreover, as is demonstrated in a further experiment, if the observer-
monkey sees only a part of the relevant movement of the hand, its brain 
“fills in” the rest of that movement, which emphasises the holistic nature of 
this resonance.   
While this is ground-breaking empirical research, Rizzolatti et al. 
acknowledge that such a way of thinking is to be found in the work of 
certain philosophers – that is, especially, phenomenologists – and, in the 
paper I cite, they even provide a brief gloss on Husserl, said to be “dedicated 
to describing the structures of experience as they present themselves to 
consciousness, without recourse to theory, deduction or assumptions from 
other disciplines, such as the natural sciences” (p. 667). 
The favoured hypothesis emphasises the primacy of a direct matching 
between the observation and the execution of an action. The authors take 
the view that the basis of imitation is what has been referred to as “response 
facilitation”—the automatic tendency to reproduce an observed movement—
and this can occur with or without an understanding of the meaning of what 
has been observed. Examples of response facilitation without understanding 
include the behaviour of birds. When a dangerous stimulus appears, shore 
birds flap their wings—first one or a few, then others follow, then the flock 
flies away. This behaviour does not necessarily require an understanding of 
the action. Neither does the capacity of newborn babies to imitate manual 
movements, however much this may contribute to a link between the 
“observing infant” and the “performing adult” (p. 668). Moreover, there may 
be a similar role of establishing interpersonal links between subjects in 
imitative behaviour, such as yawning, laughing, or perhaps crying, as well 
as in the mildly amusing example raised by Charles Darwin of sports fans 
mimicking an athlete’s movements in order to “help” him, a surprising 
example perhaps for Rizzolati et al. to cite in this connection, given the fact 
that there may surely be degrees of understanding in such imitative 
behaviour. The contrast they wish to draw is with examples of response 
facilitation where adult human observers imitate movements made by other 
people and have an understanding of what the other person is doing. It is in 
relation to this that they elaborate their distinction between motor acts and 
motor actions. The expression “motor act” refers to “a movement directed 
towards an object (or the body), which eventually allows “an effective 
interaction between the used effector and the target of the movement” (ibid.). 
Examples of motor acts are grasping an object, holding it, or bringing it to 
the mouth. By “motor action”, by contrast, they refer to a sequence of motor 
acts that, at its end, produces a reward for the acting individual. Thus, a 
motor action might be composed of a sequence of motor acts that allow 
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feeding (reaching for a piece of food, grasping it, holding it and bringing it to 
the mouth). The distinction between motor acts and “motor actions” is not 
only logically motivated: it also corresponds to the way in which the motor 
system is organized. 
Mirror neurons are elements that, on the one hand, code motor acts 
and, on the other, allow imitation to take place. The mechanism of imitation 
can be divided into three sub-mechanisms: “retrieval of a motor act, 
construction of a sequence of motor acts, and refinement of the motor act or 
of the motor sequence” (ibid.). Simply observing a motor act typically 
activates its motor representation, but imitation goes beyond understanding 
in that the observed act is not only internally represented but also externally 
manifested. The mechanism that underlies the capacity to imitate a ‘motor 
action’ (as defined above) is much more complex. The authors borrow the 
words of R. Byrne, who writes that this involves “reading the letters of action 
by means of response facilitation, action by action” (ibid.), where “letters” are 
presumably to be taken to stand for those motor acts that, when taken in 
sequence, constitute the “phrasing” of action. In Rizzolatti’s words 
elsewhere, the motor neurons seem to contain a vocabolario d’atti, which 
allows the individual not only to copy them but also to “understand” them—
that is, to understand them without directly thinking about them (see 
Cristaldi, 2009; Rizzolatti, 2008).  
In conclusion authors make the following remarks: 
 
The mirror system seems to unify in the same neural mechanism a 
variety of phenomena that range from elementary behaviours, such as 
response facilitation, to higher cognitive functions, such as imitation 
learning and action understanding. In addition, the mirror system 
could underlie other fundamental cognitive functions that have not 
been dealt with in this article, such as language understanding and 
mind reading. Although we still lack a satisfactory comprehension of 
these higher capacities, and the precise role of the mirror system in 
these functions remains unknown, we think that the mirror system 
offers a new and very promising heuristic tool for their empirical 
investigation (Rizzolatti et al., 2001, pp. 668-669). 
 
There is no doubt that these are in many respects impressive findings, and 
their congruence with armchair phenomenology is gratifying. Rizzolatti’s 
research has been influential in clinical practice, where, for example, 
deficiencies in understanding are addressed by motor therapy designed to 
active mirror responses – say, by the guiding of the patient’s hand or body. 
This happens especially in the case of those suffering from disabilities of 
various kinds, but the wider relevance of this research in education is 
relatively easy to see. It extends to the understanding of other cultures (see 
Cristaldi, 2009). Later, and setting aside “mind reading”, I shall revert to the 
suggestion that the mirror system may underlie language understanding. It 
will also be helpful to hold in mind the theoretical architecture that is 
implicit here, involving the “higher”, the “underlying” and the “fundamental”. 
I shall shortly have something to say about this. 
But first let me say why am I pursuing this topic. 
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2. Depsychologising psychology: the architecture of research and 
understanding 
  
Psychology has a degree of authority and influence in educational research 
that has not been matched by the other foundational disciplines. This has 
been achieved not so much through its consolidation as a discipline but 
rather through its extension through other, topical aspects of educational 
research, such as school effectiveness and improvement, and through its 
dilution and adaptation in popularised versions of, for example, 
management theory and behavioural therapy. This influence is bought at a 
price: it has weakened its disciplinary rigour, immunised it against some 
developments in the parent discipline, and reinforced assumptions about 
human being that, from a philosophical point of view, now look distinctly 
passé, if not downright confused. (I have in mind the misleading, if not 
plainly naïve, accounts of subjectivity and objectivity, and of fact and value, 
in some of the most widely used handbooks of educational research.) 
Moreover, the rift that emerges in the 20th century between psychology and 
psychoanalysis is now replicated in differences within educational policy 
and practice, especially insofar as counselling practices and therapeutic 
ways of thinking enter into educational institutions (see Smeyers, Smith, 
and Standish, 2006). 
 Wittgenstein was drawn to the view that the more we know about 
ourselves scientifically, the less chance we have of understanding one 
another or ourselves, and he was notoriously dismissive of psychology. On 
the very last page of the Philosophical Investigations he writes: 
 
The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by 
calling it a “young science”; its state is not comparable with that of 
physics, for instance, in its beginnings. . . For in psychology there are 
experimental methods and conceptual confusion. . . 
The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the 
means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and 
method pass one another by (p. 232).  
 
It may be difficult for some not to feel a kind of mischievous thrill at 
Wittgenstein’s remarks here, and certainly a scepticism towards psychology, 
often tinged with contempt for its more behaviourist forms, has been 
familiar enough in philosophy of education. But Wittgenstein was also 
impressed by aspects of the development of psychiatry, as seen for example 
in his conversations with Maurice Drury, and he took seriously the work of 
Freud. More generally, there is no doubting the prominence within his later 
writings of questions of psychology, and his treatment of these is surely 
aimed not at dispensing with philosophy of mind but rather at exposing 
false models of human being. It is in the light of Wittgenstein’s obsessive 
emphasis on the public nature of language and the outwardness of criteria 
that Stanley Cavell has suggested that Wittgenstein writes “in service of a 
vision that false views of the inner and of the outer produce and sustain one 
another”, and further that “the correct relation between inner and outer, 
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between the soul and its society, is the theme of the Investigations as a 
whole”: that “this theme provides its moral” (Cavell, 1979, p. 329; see also 
Cavell and Standish, 2012). This is consistent with the “therapeutic” intent 
of his work: the therapy we need, so Wittgenstein says, must undo the knots 
that our thinking has tied us up in. The thinking he has in mind is to be 
understood in terms of the excesses of theory, and while the most pressing 
example of this for him is to be found in philosophy itself, there is no doubt 
that his animus here is directed, albeit in a different way, against 
psychology. His intention is, as it were, to depsychologise psychology. 
Wittgenstein was writing some sixty years ago. Has psychology 
remained mired in conceptual confusion, or has it moved on? I shall not 
detail here the ways in which confusion of the kind Wittgenstein described 
still abounds, for it would be foolish to rest too complacently with this 
thought and so to miss what has been achieved. In this respect it is worth 
asking whether the philosopher’s mischievous thrill, which I referred to 
earlier, itself stands in need of therapy of a kind. Hence, it is in this spirit 
that I turn to the clearly substantial work of Rizzolatti. 
As we saw, Rizzolatti himself acknowledges symmetries between his 
ideas and the work of some philosophers, and he perhaps most frequently 
acknowledges Maurice Merleau-Ponty. And as the opening account should 
have made clear, his work plainly raises questions not just about body and 
mind but about their connections with culture, all of which resonate with 
Wittgenstein. But I am interested also because the examples he provides 
form a basis upon which the relation between different readings of 
Wittgenstein can be considered. In other words, how is Wittgenstein’s 
emphasis on behaviour to be understood? On the one hand, there are those 
more “behaviourist” interpretations (of course far removed anything like 
Skinnerian behaviourism), whose emphasis tends towards the naturalistic 
and the developmental, and, on the other, there are those that insist on the 
omnipresence of culture full-blown, where language is taken to have 
pervasive importance (see Standish, 2012). I want to show what I take to be 
at stake in these differences of interpretation in relation to the work 
Rizzolatti is doing. 
In the course of this I hope that the significance of the architectural 
motif will become more clear. Before saying more about Wittgenstein, then, 
let me develop this by considering the work of a philosopher who provides 
an account of perceptual judgement in which the role of bodily movement is 
central – an account that draws on Immanuel Kant but also, substantially, 
on Merleau-Ponty: Samuel Todes’ Body and World (2001). Let me add in 
passing that Todes was immensely influential on Hubert Dreyfus, and this is 
acknowledged richly in Dreyfus’ introductory essay to Todes’ book. The 
development of his own Heideggerian accounts of being-in-the-world and of 
the acquisition of competence and understanding, which have themselves 
been so influential, undoubtedly owe much to this book. 
 
3. Samuel Todes and the umbilical cord of bodily movement 
 
Body and World is a powerful book and in some ways an eccentric one. Its 
central claim is that the “failure to understand perceptual judgement opens 
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an unbridgeable gap between knowledge and feeling” (Todes, 2001, p. 261). 
Let us begin by considering some representative passages from the book, 
which I propose to quote in some detail. 
Our being in the world involves, according to Todes, first of all a 
skilled bodily comportment, through which we, for example, move to sit in a 
chair or switch on a light. There is a natural “fit” between things and our 
bodies, between body and world, and this is realized in perceptual 
judgement of this kind, through “the umbilical cord of bodily movement” (p. 
53). Todes uses the term “poise”, which he contrasts with the will, to capture 
“the perfect fit of me in my circumstances” (p. 70). It is only in moments of 
breakdown – say, where the light-switch fails to work – that we become 
cognitively aware of what is happening: “Thus, when one fails in what he is 
attempting to do, one necessarily loses his poise and is, at least, 
momentarily, thrown off balance, however quickly one may recover his 
balance and poise. To be poised is to be self-possessed by being in touch 
with one’s circumstances” (p. 66). The effect of the intrinsically habit-
forming character of perception is to stabilize our experience (p. 80): “Our 
poise is sensuous proof that the perceptual experience of our immediate 
future conforms to that of our immediate past, and without poise no 
determinate perception is possible” (p. 79). 
The structuring indicated in this and similar statements is elaborated 
in architectural terms: Todes refers recurrently to the natural philosophy of 
the body as providing a first floor for the development of understanding 
concerning higher levels of experience – “I will attempt to show that there 
are no ‘pure’ forms of conceptual imagination by showing that the whole 
level of our conceptual imagination (form as well as content) makes sense 
only in terms of a primordial level of perceptual experience” (p. 156). The 
inactively regarded object is derivative from the object that is actively felt: 
“The human body is the material subject of the world” (p. 88).  
This much, I believe, is powerful enough, but further dimensions of 
the picture need to be revealed. A critical factor in this account is its ethical 
naturalism, in which desire finds fulfilment in satisfaction: “The human 
body is first prompted to be a moving body at all, and thus to generate the 
spatiotemporal field of appearances (which is the apparent world of our 
needs), only by its needs that, literally, move the body to find pleasure 
(satisfaction of its needs), and to avoid pain (dissatisfaction of its needs)” (p. 
73). In fact, the vocabulary of fulfilment, harmonising with the elaboration of 
the “fit” between body and world, which is the ground floor of our 
experience, is strongly evident throughout the book: “Satisfaction involves a 
relation not just between ourselves and the satisfying object, but also 
between both of these and the world of experience that is to some extent 
closed and completed in the satisfaction. . . To be satisfied is to be content; 
it is to be full-filled with the given content of the world of our experience, so 
that our world no longer seems open, empty, still-to-be-satisfactorily-filled” 
(p. 59). This naturalism is more or less pervasive: “A degree of pleasure and 
of pain, of satisfaction and of dissatisfaction, thus pervades every possible 
experience in virtue of its being in the world of experience” (p. 73). The 
moderation of pleasure and pain, understood in terms of needs, suggests a 
kind of homeostasis in which a certain conception of health is modelled. 
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This brief excursion into the eloquent language of this text may well 
prompt a sense of the proximity of these thoughts to the phenomenological 
analyses developed in Heidegger’s Being and Time. While the central claim 
regarding perceptual judgement provides a sound thematic basis for the 
argument, and while the detail of the analysis is fascinating, I am less 
persuaded than Dreyfus of its originality, and there are central aspects of 
the position that is advanced that remain unconvincing. On the strength of 
these doubts, I shall in what follows raise questions for Todes’ account, 
concerning, first, the relation of perception to the social world, and, second, 
the prominence of the idea of satisfaction. 
In his own introduction to Body and World, Todes makes clear what 
he is not setting out to do. This is not a study in the social philosophy of the 
human body (concerning the body’s role in our knowledge of persons), and 
in this respect his project diverges from Rizzolatti’s research. Nor is this a 
study in what he calls the human body’s theology (concerning our sense of 
death and intimations of mortality). It is a study in the natural philosophy of 
the human body. Todes concedes that the social questions are both more 
obvious and of more general interest than the natural ones, but their 
solution, he claims, turns out to presuppose a solution to the natural ones, 
and the theological issues in turn depend on the natural and the social 
questions. As we saw above, Todes refers recurrently to the natural 
philosophy of the body as providing a first floor for the development of 
understanding concerning higher levels of experience. 
While it seems correct to say that the social philosophy of the human 
body (say, concerning gender roles or our relation to childhood, or in the 
construction of the idea of disability) depends upon the natural philosophy 
of the human body, there are problems with the suggestion that there could 
be such a natural philosophy, especially where this concerns perceptual 
knowledge, in the absence of acknowledgement of the social world. In the 
context of the social world it is indeed possible to provide an account of the 
ongoing satisfaction of the anticipations of poised perceptions. The absence 
of an attempt even to consider this in Todes’ account is remarkable, for 
without it the claim that ongoing coping gives us perceptual knowledge is 
hard to sustain. In short, there can be no account of driving a car or 
dribbling a basketball or sitting on a chair or picking up a box in the 
absence of rule-following. Todes’ discussion of rule-following is tied very 
much to his notion of habit and to what makes the world “habit-able”. But 
the crucial point, if Wittgenstein is right, is that rule-following presupposes 
the existence of a social world. Wittgenstein’s so-called Private Language 
Argument depends upon the idea that rules logically presuppose the 
possibility of mistakes, and mistakes presuppose the possibility of 
correction, which in turn requires the existence of norms of practice within a 
social group. Moreover, it is not just that the practices cited here are 
particularly complex social practices: in human activity rule-following goes 
all the way down. 
In the absence of the acknowledgement of the social world on the 
same “floor” of the building, as it were (indeed in the same rooms), Todes’ 
perceptual knowledge claim looks decidedly unsteady, if it does not smack of 
anthropomorphism. The claim would be anthropomorphic to the extent that 
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the account of perceptual knowledge depends upon full-blown human 
nature in ways that it is not prepared to acknowledge. He guards against 
some of the difficulties here with the use of inverted commas – for example, 
in referring to non-conceptual perceptual “beliefs” – but one wonders to 
what extent this textual device merely serves to hide the problem. Todes’ 
architecture persistently gives the impression that there can be perceptual 
knowledge in a human being in the absence of initiation into the social 
world. So the following questions arise: Does such knowledge extend to the 
experience of animals? If not, why not? And does it extend to infants? 
Wittgenstein’s account of something like the primordial, of “forms of life”, 
seems in part to draw attention to differences between cultural practices, 
but it is important to emphasize the greater prominence it gives to the bodily 
aspects of human beings – to the ways in which forms of life develop in 
relation to physiological needs. The idea of a form of life is closely tied to 
what Wittgenstein calls “agreement in judgements”. With this phrase, he has 
in mind not the kind of agreement that might be reached as the result of a 
debate, say, but rather the fact that human bodies condition people to find 
things the same – for example, that some things are edible and some not, or 
that a particular atmospheric temperature range is tolerable. His enigmatic 
remark, “If a lion could speak, we could not understand him” (Wittgenstein, 
1958, p. 223), testifies to the essential role of the human body in the nature 
of our thought. If a macaque could speak, we would probably not do much 
better – but the similarities between a macaque’s hand and a human hand 
understandably cause in us a sense of the uncanny, and in this there is a 
greater sense of what we can similarly grasp. These remarks demonstrate 
not only the ways in which human thought is tied to the particular 
configuration of the bodily features of human beings, a point that Todes 
richly develops, but also the fact that such thought is not generated by the 
individual alone, a point to which Todes seems blind. None of this is 
intended to defend the idea that Todes is attacking: that ongoing successful 
coping must involve conceptual identification. On the contrary, Todes is 
right to say that such (smooth, ongoing) coping excludes cognitive activity of 
this kind. But it is to emphasize that coping cannot be understood in the 
absence of the background of the social world. An essential feature of this 
social world is language, which in human experience also goes “all the way 
down”. To recognize that this is so is to foreground not abstract conceptual 
thought but rather human activity understood as rule-following practices. 
(Wittgenstein will speak of language-games, of course.) While there are forms 
of human activity that do not directly involve language, they are 
nevertheless characterized by a background that is linguistic. It is in the 
light of that background that it does indeed become plausible enough to 
speak of non-conceptual perceptual knowledge. But a further point follows 
from this to the effect that while the infant has the same bodily 
configuration as the adult, any claims to perceptual knowledge on her part 
must be severely constrained by the fact that she is not (yet) a participant in 
the linguistic practice that is the condition for such knowledge. In other 
words, perceptual knowledge in its mature forms cannot develop in advance 
of social and linguistic initiation, and so to speak of the perceptions of the 
infant does indeed involve a degree of anthropomorphism. This is not to say 
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that language must come first: there are no firsts; light dawns gradually 
over the whole. But Todes’ argument seems to proceed as if the linguistic 
turn had never happened. In sum, this brings me to the conclusion that 
Todes’ account of this first floor of our experience cannot stand up in the 
absence of the acknowledgement of the social world. 
The second, more qualified question that I raise has to do with how far 
Todes’ thought is constrained by the limitations of the economies of 
satisfaction that are central to his argument. I referred to these above in 
terms of his ethical naturalism. How far do these fail to do justice to the 
body and to perception? Todes draws a distinction between objective and 
subjective satisfaction. A sentence such as “I am satisfied that she is dead” 
is ambiguous, in the absence of any determining context, between my 
having evidence that she is dead and my being pleased or relieved by this 
fact. In the former case, I am satisfied that something is so, while in the 
latter I am satisfied by its being so. In other words, objective satisfaction 
relates primarily to conditions of truth, while subjective satisfaction refers to 
conditions of desire. This economy has a bearing on how truth and desire 
are conceived. Thus in objective satisfaction, it becomes apparent that truth 
is understood in terms of correctness (or adequation) and not aletheia (that 
is, truth as revealing). (Of course, the vocabulary of correctness belongs to 
propositional rather than perceptual knowledge, but I am suggesting that in 
the account of perceptual satisfaction it comes to shape the understanding 
of perception also.) How, it needs to be asked, might an account of 
perceptual knowledge that derived from notions of aletheia be different? In 
subjective satisfaction, desire is understood in relation to lack. Hence both 
are tied to economies of thought that, on certain arguments (say, those of 
Deleuze or Levinas, or Kierkegaard or Nietzsche, or for that matter Heidegger 
himself), close off possibilities of understanding the human condition – mind 
and body – and that constrain the ways in which the possibilities of life 
might be conceived. Ethical naturalism along these lines amounts to a 
constriction of ethics itself. 
It will be recalled that Todes insists that his concern is not with the 
theology of the human body. He uses this phrase, let it be remembered, to 
refer not to matters of theistic belief but to our sense of death and 
intimations of mortality. What is noticeable, however, is that there are 
points in Todes’ text at which something seems to break through, something 
beyond any simple economy of need and satisfaction. Todes acknowledges 
that satiation, like apathy and frustration, can make one “incapable of 
responding to anything through felt want” (p. 69). And recognizing the role 
of affect in both subjective and objective forms of satisfaction, he draws 
attention to an interesting asymmetry between the way that the former 
tends to be characterized by relief from distress, or the gratification of 
desire, and the way that the latter encompasses not only some sense of relief 
but also a positive pleasure at the original stimulation – a pleasure 
prompting us to similar exertion in the future, making us keener for 
experience and heightening our sensitivity. In the light of Todes’ valuable 
observation here, I want to draw attention also to a perhaps muted but 
nevertheless welcome irruptive element in his language. He speaks more 
than once in almost Dionysian terms of the “clamorous chorus” of needs (p. 
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67); the boy who looks up at the hills of the valley in which he has grown up 
finds the “beckoning” horizon, calling him to give what lies beyond it, “the 
determination of place” (p. 57); more bleakly he acknowledges Auschwitz as 
a “break-out-from the world” (p. 62). It is language such as this that 
intimates momentarily something beyond or other than the satisfaction of 
needs, though the extent of the importance of this for Todes is difficult to 
fathom. Moments of insight these may be, but the significance of the present 
discussion remains very much with the question of the kind of place that is 
given to ongoing skilled coping in the living of our lives and, hence, in the 
understanding of body and mind. Todes’ architecture gives it foundational 
importance.1 
 
4. Objects and things, habitats and worlds 
 
It is not surprising that Rizzolatti and others have emphasised the 
importance of the mirror system not only in “elementary behaviours” but in 
“higher cognitive functions, such as imitation and action understanding” 
(Rizzolatti et al., 2001, pp. 668-669). The conceptual architecture is such 
that motor acts are taken to be the foundation stones of thought. But I want 
to question the way motor acts are understood in relation to language, 
referred to in these lines both as fundamental and as a higher capacity. And 
this puts pressure on Rizzolatti’s readiness to speak of a vocabulary of acts. 
How far do those acts depend upon a vocalisation of some kind? How far is 
this just a turn of phrase? One senses, of course, that it is the latter, a mere 
image, and this reinforces the impression that the architecture here is 
naturalistic and developmental: a first floor of motor acts provides the basis 
for the later construction of language, in parallel to the way that for Todes, it 
is the first floor natural philosophy of the body that provides the basis for its 
social philosophy and subsequent theology. 
Of course, there are important differences between Rizzolatti and 
Todes. Todes’ first floor natural philosophy is concerned with the relation of 
the body to the world, its natural fit with things, and this is understood to 
be in some sense pre-social. Rizzolatti differentiates his own research from 
neuroscience concerned with object recognition, affirming that his field is 
the understanding of the actions of others. And yet it would be wrong to 
think of Todes as providing an account of object recognition or even 
comportment towards objects. He is concerned with the relation of the 
human body to things. The reproach here is targeted similarly to 
Wittgenstein’s reprimand about the misunderstanding of psychological 
concepts (seeing, hearing, thinking, understanding): “Psychological concepts 
are just everyday concepts. They are not newly fashioned by science for its 
own purpose, as are the concepts of physics and chemistry. Psychological 
concepts are related to those of the exact sciences as the concepts of the 
science of medicine are to those of old women who spend their time nursing 
the sick” (Wittgenstein, 1980, #62). The relation to things is an everyday 
relation. Whereas an object is abstracted and neutralised, and only 
contingently invested with meaning, a thing is already perceived within a 
framework of significance – that is, within a world. We can ask also: Is the 
human being’s relation to the morsel of food the same as the macaque’s? 
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Yes and no. Both pick up food with their hands and put it in their mouths, 
and both must do this to survive; both can delight in this and to some 
extent share in that delight. But for the human this happens in a world of 
meaning, whereas we might, following Heidegger, say that the macaque is 
world-less, having only a habitat. What is it to have a world? 
In an interview Rizzolati offers the following example. Imagine that we 
enter a bar and see a man with a cup in his hand. Instinctively we know 
that he is drinking coffee: we recognise his movements and understand his 
intentions, and we do this without thinking about it. We can do this because 
beyond having the evidence before our eyes, we have it in our heads. 
Rizzolatti’s explanation is provocative and, I think, convincing. But what, I 
want to ask, is it that we see or have in our heads? We are given the holistic 
picture of a man drinking coffee. But what coffee is this, and where? 
Because this is Rizzolatti, I guess we are in Italy, and so I imagine that this 
is a small white cup and the coffee to be espresso. Perhaps “Lavazza” is 
written on the saucer. Perhaps the man is sitting at a table looking onto the 
sunlit street, Corriere Della Sera spread across the table. And what, after all, 
is coffee? How was it that Jim Jarmusch could make the film Coffee and 
Cigarettes? Could a macaque see this? The point is not that all this detail is 
explicitly entertained: we do not directly consider any of this, but this is the 
texture of experience, of the world, within which seeing occurs. The 
innocence of “seeing a man with a cup in his hand” belies the fact that 
genuinely to see this is to open a world. Of course, we can progressively 
abstract from this – “seeing a human being holding an object”, etc. – and 
that is what science sometimes does, but it is not what Todes seeks to do, 
nor Wittgenstein, nor Heidegger. And doesn’t Rizzolatti’s account point away 
from abstraction too – in spite of the vocabulary of laboratory 
experimentation he inevitably adopts, and as is perhaps revealed more than 
he intends in his “vocabulary of acts”, in “letters of action”? 
The naturalistic and developmental aspects of Rizzolatti’s research, 
and the architecture that structures this, are compatible with the more 
“behaviourist” readings of Wittgenstein, but they are at odds with 
interpretations that emphasise the omnipresence of culture and language as 
pervasive. And as my criticism of Todes and my discussion of coffee are 
intended to show, it is the latter that I think are the more convincing. If this 
is right, it does not necessarily undermine Rizzolatti’s project, nor lessen the 
interest of his findings. Rather it suggests that the holistic nature of his 
account of the functioning of mirror-neurons needs expansion. The 
abstracted laboratory example of the macaque’s observation of a hand 
placing food on a tray is expanded to the everyday one of seeing someone 
holding a coffee-cup. The laboratory hides the world; coffee opens it up. 
Hence, there is reason here for a richer, more holistic account of what is 
going on, and neuroscience as pursued by Rizzolatti can perhaps benefit 
from this. 
I commented at the start on the considerable significance of mirror-
neuron research for rehabilitative therapy, specifically, and for education, 
more generally, and indeed practical applications have developed in various 
ways. Rizzolatti acknowledges the significance of phenomenology for his own 
work, and this further demonstrates what can be achieved without recourse 
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to laboratory experimentation. Should we, however, also entertain the 
somewhat negative thought that perhaps what has been discovered here is, 
in practical terms, no more than what good sports coaches and 
physiotherapists, not to mention teachers of music and dance, have long 
known?2 If there is some truth to this, it remains the case that the discovery 
of the mirror system provides a scientific endorsement for what such 
practitioners intuitively know. But there is evidence also for ways in which 
the research has prompted approaches that would perhaps not otherwise 
have been considered ([examples. . .]). In sum, it does seem that, in 
neuroscience, Rizzolatti’s work moves us away from “false views of the inner 
and of the outer [that] produce and sustain one another”. And to the extent 
that it is (cognitive?) capacities in relation to things, and not to objects, that 
needs to be understood, and to the extent that things cannot be understood 
in the absence of those holistic meaningful contexts in which the social and 
the “theological” are already present, his work may have a more far-reaching 
importance for neuroscience than is currently acknowledged. Perhaps then, 
within a different architecture, it might also gesture towards “the correct 
relation between inner and outer, between the soul and its society”.3 
 
Correspondence: Paul Standish, Centre for Philosophy, Institute of 
Education, London, 20 Bedford Way, London WC1H0AL, UK. E-mail: 
p.standish@ioe.ac.uk. 
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3 I would like to thank Melita Cristaldi for helpful discussions that drew my attention to the 
fruitfulness of Rizzolatti’s work.  
